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HISTORICAL DATA RECORD

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FROM: 1 Jan 69 TO: 31 Mar 69

RE: CONTROL SYMBOL
AU-DS

FROM: (NAME AND LOCATION OF UNIT SUBMITTING THIS REPORT)
7th Air Force TACC (TACO)
APO San Francisco 96307

TO:
7th Air Force TACC (TACA)
APO San Francisco 96307

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED FOR ANY ITEM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS INDICATING APPLICABLE ITEM NUMBER.

SECTION I ASSIGNMENT

MAJOR AIR COMMAND	NUMBERED AIR FORCE	AIR DIVISION	WING	GROUP
PACAF	7			

SECTION II SUBORDINATE UNITS

(Empty space for subordinate units)

SECTION III MISSIONS

A. PRIMARY (U) The Current Operations Division of the Tactical Air Control Center directs and controls the offense and defense air effort in South Vietnam. The Division insures effective execution of operations orders and directs the air effort as required to accomplish objectives. The Division monitors all air movements within the Danang and Saigon Air Defense Sub-Sectors of the Mainland Southeast Asia Air Defense Region. Maintains on plotting boards a visual presentation of the current air situation in South Vietnam. Status boards are maintained to reflect air defense (cont)

B. SECONDARY (OR OTHER)

(Empty space for secondary missions)

SECTION IV PERSONNEL

STATUS	OFFICERS	AIRMEN	CIVILIANS	TOTAL
ASSIGNED	24	36	0	60
AUTHORIZED	24	25	0	49
ATTACHED	0	0	0	0

SECTION V EQUIPMENT

A. AIRCRAFT	B. WEAPONS (INCLUDING MISSILES)
C. ELECTRONICS	D. OTHER

Downgraded at 3 Year Intervals
Declassified After 12 Years
DOD Directive 5200.10

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TACO-69-0064

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INSTRUCTIONS ON INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE NARRATIVE

1. Changes in commanders, key staff officers, and inclusive dates of each incumbent during the reporting period
2. Elaborate on mission-type equipment recorded in Section 5 of this form. Include the quantity at the beginning of reporting period and all additions, losses, transfers, etc., during period covered. Give reason for each loss or transfer. Explain major modifications to unit equipment.
3. Operational units, include a summary of missions and sorties, hours flown, purpose or objective and results. Report air victims, include aircraft and pilot losses, pilots missing or rescued. Record unique highlights, details of overall performance (reduced to statistics), tactics used and changes, and other matters bearing on mission performance. Discuss maintenance and supply achievements and problems and significant facility changes.

SECTION VI

NARRATIVE

1. (U) Awards were presented to the following TACO personnel:

BRONZE STAR

Lt Col Jack L. Price
 Lt Col John E. Downey
 Lt Col William H. Domke
 Major Donald A. Doran
 Major Curtis M. Burns
 Capt Mark J. Daniels
 Capt Robert J. Fanthorpe
 SMSgt William J. Donnelly
 MSgt James A. McPhail
 TSgt Clifton R. McCamman
 SSgt Jerry D. Douglas

2. (U) Colonel Horace S. Reece replaced Colonel Winfield W. Scott as Chief, Current Operations Division on 14 January 1969.
 3. (C) On 2 January, the AC-119G flare/gunship began combat air patrols in SVN.
 4. (C) In January, reports of unidentified helicopter sightings in Western II CTZ increased concern that this could represent a threat to I FFORCEV operational area. A program to attempt identification of these tracks was proposed by 7AF in January, approved by COMUSMACV and implemented on 1 Feb. It established a nightly prohibited flying area, emplaced an Army HAWK radar in the area and employed airborne vehicles to investigate the tracks. USAF AC-119G, AC-47, O-1, A-1 aircraft and US Army OV-1, UH-1H aircraft have been used. For approximately three weeks in March, an Army anti-aircraft searchlight was positioned in the area for use. Also, representatives from MACV Office of Scientific Advisors made three visits to record HAWK radar doppler audio returns from track detections, for comparison with cataloged recordings of foreign nation's helicopters. As of 31 March no positive identifications could be made and the program continues surveillance and investigation.
 5. (C) The 2nd day of the new year saw the highest number of strike sorties, 717, flown since the previous September. On 3 January the sorties dropped back to normal and the average daily sortie rate for January was 568. February brought the grounding of the A-37s on the 9th, due to wing span problem. A special team came and began putting them back into service in March. First half of February was characterized by preparation for the expected TET offensive. On TET, 17 February, our forces observed a 24 hour stand-down. As usual this period of time was marred by numerous VC violations. Over 100 alert sorties were flown during the stand-down period in response to VC attacks. The expected TET offensive came late enough to be called the Post TET Offensive, on 23 February. The activity built up to a high point of 733
- (cont)

SECTION III (Cont)

A. Primary: tactical action, ground electronic equipment status, aircraft status, air defense fighter alert status, naval vessel locations, current and forecast weather, HAWK missile status, and the pre-planned and immediate missions for each of the four Corps areas in South Vietnam. The Current Operations Division maintains a 24 hour seven day a week work schedule in exercising control of the South Vietnam air resources. Responsible for the operations of the Combat Operations Center, Tactical Air Control Center, and the Tactical Air Control System.

SECTION IV (Cont)

strike sorties on 23 February and was over 650 the remaining three days of February. With the late month surge, the average daily sortie rate still only hit 559 for February. The Post TET Offensive continued unabated well into March and brought the average sortie rate to 600 for the month.

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HISTORICAL DATA RECORD

REPORTING PERIOD
 FROM 1 Apr 69 TO 30 Jun 69

RE CONTROL SYMBOL
 AU-DS

FROM: (NAME AND LOCATION OF UNIT SUBMITTING THIS REPORT)
 7th Air Force TACC (TACO)
 APO San Francisco 96307

TO:
 7th Air Force TACC (TACA)
 APO San Francisco 96307

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SECTION I ASSIGNMENT

MAJOR AIR COMMAND	NUMBERED AIR FORCE	AIR DIVISION	WING	GROUP
PACAF	7			

SECTION II SUBORDINATE UNITS

SECTION III MISSIONS

A. PRIMARY (U) The Current Operations Division of the Tactical Air Control Center directs and controls the offensive and defensive air effort in South Vietnam. The Division insures effective execution of operations orders and directs the air effort as required to accomplish objectives. The Division monitors all air movements within the Da Nang and Saigon Air Defense Sub-Sectors of the Mainland Southeast Asia Air Defense Region. Maintains, on plotting boards, a visual presentation of the current air situation in South Vietnam. Status boards are maintained to reflect air. (Cont.)

B. SECONDARY (OR OTHER)

SECTION IV PERSONNEL

STATUS	OFFICERS	AIRMEN	CIVILIANS	TOTAL
ASSIGNED	19	28	0	47
AUTHORIZED	24	31	0	55
ATTACHED	0	0	0	0

SECTION V EQUIPMENT

A. AIRCRAFT	B. WEAPONS (INCLUDING MISSILES)
C. ELECTRONICS	D. OTHER

TACO-69-0159

SECRET

INSTRUCTIONS ON INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE NARRATIVE

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SECTION VI

NARRATIVE

1. (U) Awards were presented to the following TACO personnel:

Bronze Star

Col Horace S. Reece
 Lt Col James D. Smith
 Capt James W. Hurt III
 Capt David G. Karstedt
 Maj Gregory S. Guirm
 SMSgt William R. Sigler Jr.
 TSgt Russell B. Spaulding
 SSgt George A. James

Commendation Medal

TSgt Alva S. Gibbs
 Sgt Leland G. Stokes
 Sgt Paul E. Michaels
 Sgt Kenneth J. Mitzel
 Sgt Ronald J. Sigg
 Sgt Lawrence L. Hoenshell
 SSgt Alfred L. Hoskins
 Sgt William L. Reese

2. (U) The following personnel were promoted during the period:

Major Jerry L. Welch to Lt Col
 MSgt James A. McPhail to SMSgt
 Sgt Lloyd Cawthon Jr. to SSgt
 Sgt Rand G. Phillips to SSgt
 A1C Georeg P. Miller to Sgt

3. (U) The project (Western Pistol) to identify unknown airborne objects in Western II Corps Tactical Zone continued throughout the period. Track data reported by the Combat Reporting Post at Pleiku and the Hawk radar site at LZ Oasis were recorded and analyzed during April and early May. Most tracks were investigated by helicopter crews scrambled from strip alert at LZ Oasis. On two occasions in April, these air crews reported sighting a blacked out silhouette of a helicopter, for very short duration, which they compared to a Soviet type helicopter in an identification manual. On the night of 10 May, LZ Oasis came under ground attack and the Hawk site had two prime radars destroyed by rockets and also sustained damage to other equipment. No concrete results had been attained from the project at this point with the exception of the two possible identifications noted above. On 27 June, the USAF Director of the TACC briefed COMUSMACV on the project status, concluding that there was no hard evidence of enemy helicopter operation in the area and recommending termination of the project. COMUSMACV approved the conclusions with the intention of terminating the project.

4. (U) During the period, Lt Col Kissinger completed a study on Command Post Proliferation. The study revealed that the build-up of numerous command posts on Seventh Air Force bases was the result of piecemeal growth and occurred as new missions and accompanying equipment were introduced in South Vietnam. The conclusion was that long term command post requirements should be met at each single wing base by

a maximum of two command posts. One would perform command and control functions for all tactical air to include fighters, rescue, gunship, herbicide, tactical air support, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, central security control, and the wing/base battle staff. The other command post should collocate the functions of the aerial port complex to include base operations, the airlift control element, the aerial port coordinator, and the aeromedical evacuation center. Concurrent with, and following the study, at several bases actions were taken to collocate separate command posts into single facilities. The previous high of 41 command and control centers was reduced to 36.

5. (U) Colonel Evan W. Rosencrans replaced Colonel Horace S. Reece as Chief, Current Operations Division on 4 May 1969.

6. (U) Beginning in April, a re-study of the adequacy and timeliness of immediate close air support was begun to determine the actual requirement and the alternatives available to meet it. As part of the study, specific tests and evaluations were conducted on armed FAC operations, TAC Air involvement in troops in contact (TIC) situations, and tactical fighter response time. The study was completed in June with the following conclusions and actions taken.

- a. (1) The armed OV-10 FAC provides a limited but highly responsive immediate strike capability and an increased Air Force involvement in TICs.
- (2) Air Force responsiveness to immediate requests is not accurately portrayed in the present DASC data file.
- (3) Provisions should be made in the DASC reporting system to distinguish between immediate flights, follow-on flights, and TOT type flights, and to correct omissions and errors in accumulated data.
- (4) All holding delays should be coded so that non-Air Force caused delays can be considered separately.
- (5) In most cases, TAC Air response time provides the ground commander close air support before the tactical ground situation will permit ordnance delivery.
- (6) The daytime employment of the AC-119 Gunship would detract from its critical night-time role.
- (7) Armed OV-10 aircraft in conjunction with timely response of TAC Air provide phased response and appropriate support of daytime TIC situations.
- (8) Air Force gunships in conjunction with armed FACs for emergency situations and TAC Air when needed, provide phased response and appropriate support for night-time TIC situations.

b. ACTIONS TAKEN:

- (1) Recommendations have been made to PACAF to revise the automated reporting system.
- (2) 7th Air Force has instituted a manual reporting system to provide an accurate picture immediately, and to provide a cross-check on the accuracy of the revised automated system. This manual system includes gunships and

armed FACs.

- (3) ALL OV-10 FAC aircraft have been armed with 2.75 HE rockets in addition to marking rockets.
- (4) All OV-10 FAC aircraft will additionally be armed with M-600 machine guns when the necessary personnel and materiel support becomes available.
- (5) Action has been taken, consistent with safety, to reduce scramble times, enroute times, and Air Force caused holding delays in the target area.

7. (U) Tactical Air played a vital role in the support of the Special Force/Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camps at Ben Het and Katum. The enemy offensive campaign to over-run Ben Het began on 8 May 69. Over the next 57 days, approximately 4,639 rounds of rocket, mortar, and artillery fire were directed against the Ben Het/Dak To CIDG Complex by the enemy. A total of 571 sorties were flown by FACs in support of operations in the tri-border area during this two month period. Air Force gunships flew over 100 sorties and expended almost 60,000 rounds of ammunition. During the campaign, over 1,800 TAC Air sorties were flown in support of troops in contact and against confirmed enemy locations such as weapons positions, assembly areas, supply points, base camps, and along infiltration routes. During inclement weather, and at night, maximum utilization was made of Combat Sky Spot delivery techniques; 641 of these sorties were made in the two month period, for an average of 11 per day. Throughout the campaign, air power played a dynamic and vital role. By 29 June, the enemy had lifted his siege of the camp and had begun his withdrawal from the area. At Katum, the enemy ground-to-air fire downed a C-130 on 23 June and tactical air responded to suppress the ground fire. 76 sorties were directed against enemy fire positions during 23-24-25 June.

8. (U) On 19 June 1969, TACO received notification that the 5/56 Artillery (AD)(HAWK) USA, at Chu Lai and the 1st LAAM Battalion (HAWK) USMC, at Da Nang would redeploy from SVN in August 1969. Since this would affect the air defense weapons posture in SVN, TACO coordinated release of these units from operational control of the Commander SEA Air Defense Region (COM7AF) effective 1 July 1969.

SECTION III(Cont)

A. Primary:

defense tactical action, ground electronic equipment status, aircraft status, air defense fighter alert status, naval vessel locations, current and forecast weather, HAWK missile status, and the pre-planned and immediate missions for each of the four Corps areas in South Vietnam. The Current Operations Division maintains a 24 hour seven day a week work schedule in exercising control of the South Vietnam air resources. Responsible for the operations of the Combat Operations Center, Tactical Air Control Center, and the Tactical Air Control System.